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ABSTRACT: International capital markets, in general, seem to be volatile markets, influenced by 
many factors, a phenomenon that affects both developed markets, as well as least developed, with 
emerging market economies suffering most because of this. It is clear, however, that volatility will 
remain for as long as it is delayed the adoption of specific measures at national and international 
financial architecture level, measures that may be necessary to reduce these risks, to limit their 
impact, and that the question financial market can relapse in a manner as efficiently as possible. 
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Reducing volatility is an important objective stated by the recent reforms. Mainly, because 
the high volatility of the international capital markets, and the narrowed capacity of handling this 
volatility  by  this  markets,  makes  the  countries  beneficiary  of  the  contagion,  vulnerable  to 
excessively big shocks and crises. Secondly, international capital markets appear to be extremely 
susceptible to contagion in a frequent manner.  
The exact causes of this volatility are not yet known, or the best international financial 
architecture that can regulate international capital movements. However, reducing volatility and 
contagion was an important stated objective of recent reforms, contributing to the emergence of two 
important reasons for reshaping the international financial architecture and standardization of the 
global economy. First, the high volatility of international capital flows on the emerging markets and 
the limited capacity of these markets to cope with this volatility make the contagion "beneficiary" 
country vulnerable to excessively high shocks and crises, frequently and in a disturbing manner. 
Secondly, the international capital markets appear to be extremely susceptible to contagion. Such 
proposals  to  reform  the  international  financial  architecture  should  be  based  on  a  thorough 
understanding of the contagion causes and consequences. 
During periods of crisis, the transmission of shocks are transmitted appears to be different 
and  these  differences  appear  to  be  important  for  the  investors.  Empirical  studies  have  helped 
identify the types of links between countries and other conditions that make a country vulnerable to 
contagion  during  financial  crisis,  although  very  little  is  known  about  the  importance  of 
macroeconomic and institutional factors in the propagation of financial shocks. In the same time 
empirical research has helped identify the countries that are exposed to risk of contagion and some 
interventionist policy that can reduce risks, although they were able to be identified in a way that is 
too general to be helpful. Saying that the volatility is a reason is not helping. It might be helpful to 
find the limit of volatility from which the country enters in a danger zone. 
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The link between volatility and contagion 
Much of the current debate on reforming international financial architecture is aimed at 
reducing the risk of contagion   best defined, as we already have pointed, as a significant increase of 
market linkages after a shock suffered by a country (or group of countries). This definition stresses 
the  importance  of  other  links  through  which  shocks  are  normally  transmitted,  including  trade 
between countries and financial links. During periods of crisis, the way the shocks are transmitted 
appears to be different and these differences appear to be important. Empirical studies have helped 
identify the types of links between countries and other macroeconomic conditions that may make a 
country vulnerable to contagion during financial crisis, although very little is known about the 
importance of macroeconomic and institutional factors in the propagation of financial shocks. In the 
same time empirical research has helped identify the countries that are exposed to risk of contagion 
and some interventionist policy that can reduce risks, although they were able to be identified in a 
way that is too general to be helpful. 
We can say that contagion is the migration of market disturbances   mostly those who have 
a negatively impact on the market   from one country to another, a process observed through the 
exchange  rates,  prices  of  shares,  bonds,  and  capital  evolution  (or  trend).  The  main  causes  of 
contagion can be divided conceptually into two categories. The first category focuses on across the 
border  influences  arising  from  the  normal  interdependence  between  open  economies.  This 
interdependence makes shocks, whether globally or locally, to be transmitted between countries, 
because of the real and financial links between them. The second category involves a financial 
crisis, which is not linked to observed changes in macroeconomic bases or other fundamental bases, 
but it is only the result of the investors behavior or so it seems. 
Propagation of financial crisis depends on the integration degree of the financial market. If a 
country is completely integrated into the international financial market, or if the financial markets in 
one region are very well connected, assets prices and other macroeconomic variables will evolve in 
the same manner. The higher is the integration degree, the greater would be the contagion effects of 
a shock from another country. Conversely, countries that are not financially integrated, because of 
the limited access to the capital markets or the lack of access to the international financing, are, by 
definition,  immune  to  contagion.  In  this  sense,  global  financial  markets  would  facilitate  the 
transmission  of  shocks,  but  it  wouldn’t  cause  them.  Actions  of  investors,  who  are  ex ante 
individually rational, and also collectively rational, even if leads to volatility and may require policy 
changes, should be considered to be fundamental causes. 
Governments and the private sector, as well as international financial institutions, should 
take measures to minimize and manage the risk of financial contagion. But it is not clear how these 
measures must be combined to obtain the best result possible. But, should every country have the 
task of improving its financial sector and increase transparency of data, or there is a need to reform 
in line with international rules by which investors must operate? Does contagion always show the 
influence of basic factors or countries simply should have access to greater liquidity so they can 
withstand the pressures of contagion? To get answers, you must first look at what is known about 
the causes and transmission of contagion. 
Causes of contagion appearance can be divided conceptually into two categories. The first 
category focuses on across the border influences arising from the normal interdependence between 
open economies. This interdependence makes shocks, whether globally or locally, to be transmitted 
between countries, because of the real and financial links between them. 
Reacting in the same manner would not normally be called contagion, but if this occurs 
during a period of crisis and their effect is negative, than this can be called contagion. Most of 
empirical works seek to explain and compute the degree to which markets react to the same kind of 
factors and the transmitting mechanisms, for example, how and under what conditions a speculative Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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attack on a currency can influence other currencies linked through fundamental relationships of any 
kind (trade, macroeconomic policy, etc.). 
The second category involves a financial crisis, which is not linked to observed changes in 
macroeconomic bases or other fundamental bases, but it is only the result of the investors behavior 
or  other  financial  agent’s  behavior.  In  this  definition,  contagion  appears  when  a  cross  border 
influence  come  out  on  another  market,  even  when  there  are  no  global  shocks  and  the 
interdependence and fundamental factors are not the ones that have triggered it. A crisis in one 
country may, for example, lead investors to withdraw founds from more then one market without 
taking into account the fundamental economic differences between them. This type of contagion is 
often said to be caused by "irrational" behavior, such as financial panic, the effect of collective 
behavior (heard), loss of trust and increased aversion to risk. 
 
Investor behavior 
Empirical evidence which seem to strongly contradict the assumption that price cannot be 
determined, but is obtained randomly (random walk) have stimulated the recent development of 
what has come to be known as "behavior finance". Assumptions behind the theories on the behavior 
of investors are often based on psychological research or common sense. However, clearly, the 
study of the behavior or the development of financial markets could benefit of a more complete 
image,  if  it  would  be  known  how  investors  actually  behave  and  how  they  react  to  the  same 
information depending on the differences between them (behavior conduct).     
In the context of the recent financial crisis, was supported by some experts that foreign 
portfolio investors may have been those which by their reaction (which had the same effect as the 
market trends) have led to the propagation of the crisis that began in the United States (eg, rushing 
to buy when the market is growing and rushing to sell when the market is declining), and by their 
mutual desire to copy the behavior of other investors, ignored  the information on the economic 
fundamentals of the countries on which markets they were investing. This kind of behavior could be 
exacerbated by the crisis in a manner not justified by the economic characteristics of the country. 
Understanding the behavior of foreign investors is also relevant to the discussion on the opportunity 
of  having  control  over  the  invested capital.  A  careful  statistic  documentation  of  the investors’ 
trading  behavior  in  order  to  bring  evidence  for  supporting  the  fairness  or  falsity  of  these 
assumptions is quite small, because there are very few such studies. But the assumption may be 
related to the development of new literatures in investor’s behavior, especially in the financial 
intern  context  where  there  aren’t  yet  too  developed  individual  investors  from  the  financial 
knowledge point of view. For example, it was supported the hypothesis that the trading behavior of 
individual investors is often influenced by irrationality, meaning shocks of emotional nature. It was 
also supported by some experts that institutional investors often have a behavior that imitates the 
conduct of the other investors from the market, alleged to be more informed, although this trend is 
in  quantitative  low.  There  are  also  theoretical  models,  in  which  there  are  irrational  investors 
disturbing  the  market  and  rational  investors  who  pursued  positive  strategies  of  feedback 
destabilizing prices in the process. 
There  is  the  concern  that  international  portfolio  investors  can  transmit  information 
(including events, or lessons and experiences gained from a particular market) and that by sharing 
information they find on a market to another market could destabilize the second one. 
We can question, however, that by their behavior whether rational or irrational investors 
allow shocks form a country to cross geographic boundaries and to affect the financial market of 
another country. 
Another cause of contagion concerns imperfect information and differences between the 
investors’ expectations. In the absence of better information which asserts the contrary, investors 
may believe that a financial crisis in one country could lead to similar crises in other countries. A 
crisis in one country can influence the exchange rate of currencies of other countries with similar Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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economic  conditions,  and  in  investors  mind  is  likely  that  the  same  problem  occur  here.  Such 
behavior may reflect the rational and as well the irrational behavior. If a crisis reflects and reveals 
weak  economic  foundation,  investors  may  rationally  conclude  that  the  country  which  is 
economically and even geographically in the same place, will probably face the same problems; 
such judgments helps to explain the way in which crises are contagious. This transmission channel 
assumes, of course, that investors are incorrectly informed about the actual characteristics of each 
country and therefore they make decisions based on known indicators, including those that have 
been highlighted in other countries, which may or not reflect the actual state of the vulnerability of 
the country in question. Information that investors use can also include actions taken by other 
investors, which leads us to the information asymmetry effect on the investors behavior. 
Often investors do not have a full picture of economic conditions since this affects their 
profits, for that to hold as much information about the market in which they are investing they have 
to spend more and thus their profits will decrease, at least theoretically. In part, this limitation 
reflects the cost of collecting and processing the information. 
Brokers, traditionally rational agents, recognize that financial agents could close irrational 
transactions,  but  argue  that  this  way  of  trading  does  not  substantially  affect  the  prices  as 
sophisticated  investors  (arbitrageurs)  conduct  rapid  contrary  operations  in  order  to  eliminate 
deviations from the “true” economic value. With this scenario in mind we can say that speculative 
irrational bubbles can not appear. However, if arbitrageurs are faced with limited capital and assess 
their investment within a finite time horizon, they could not act against what they see as a deviation 
from the true economic value. From this point of view, arbitrageurs can not remove a speculative 
bubble, but neither will participate actively in its formation. 
Optimal planning for individuals and organizations depends primarily on the present and 
forecasted level (or computed based on past income) of income in aggregate stock market. Rapid 
changes  in  market  prices  could  cause  an  incorrect  allocation  of  resources  which  can  be  very 
expensive. 
Imagine in alternative a world in which smart investors or arbitrageurs, in fact, can see the 
direction in which the uninformed investors will be trading and will act before this investors’ action 
can influence price. Shiller (2000) bring into discussion another reason why institutional capital 
may evolve in line with the market, noting that: “professional investors… are not immune to the 
“popular” culture of investment which we can observe at individual investors" wanting to show that 
if the great mass of investors considered a investment profitable (for example), actions taken by 
them in accordance with their beliefs will influence professionals investors too. 
Taking into account the fixed cost of collecting and processing information, most small 
investors simply can not afford to collect and process information specific to each country. In 
contrast, uninformed investors can find a less costly way and, therefore, more advantageous, to 
follow  the  trading  patterns  of  informed  investors.  In  making  economic  decisions,  uninformed 
investors can then take into account portfolio decisions taken by better informed investors, because 
such decisions may provide useful information on the market. 
Both  informed  and  uninformed  investors  tend  to  seek  out  new  information  from  those 
investors who have acted before them to adjust their portfolios. So, if informed investors withdraw 
their capital held in a market, information cascade makes that less informed investors to disregard 
their own information and act in the same sense as informed investors, thus leading to greater 
output of the capital market. The tendency to follow a collective behavior may increase as countries 
in  which  investments  may  be  placed  increased  and  investor’s  number  increased,  therefore 
increasing the fixed costs of collecting and processing information specific to each country. 
Another explanation for the increasing trend of collective behavior is that while investors 
have become increasingly diverse and establishing a reputation in the market has become relatively 
more expensive,  investors are finding to be less expensive to follow "the herd". Because some 
investors, particularly fund managers, may be more concerned about maintaining a reputation that Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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would depend on the performance of their portfolios in relation to a given portfolio of the market, 
rather than their absolute performance, risk of behavior cascade may be particularly high among 
institutional investors. Thus, an individual institutional investor may refrain from taking action first, 
even if market developments favor a new portfolio, for fear of losing good reputation if the decision 
would prove to be wrong. To be on the safe side, individual investors can follow the collective 
behavior. All these results imply a rational behavior (albeit limited), but which, however, can cause 
volatility in financial markets. 
Imitating a collective behavior shows a tendency in investors behavior of a particular group 
to mimic each other trading strategies. Portfolio investors can follow the herd both rational and 
irrational. Information’s asymmetry may cause uninformed investors, but rational ones, to choose to 
act in the same way as informed investors do, because this ones are thought to be also rational, 
meaning they will also want to obtain profit; such an example is the "positive feedback" trading 
model where someone buys securities when their price increases and sells them when prices are 
falling. This trading pattern may be the result of the extrapolation of investor expectations about the 
prices of securities, of the automatic orders to stop losses when the price falls below a certain limit, 
of the forced liquidation when an investor is unable to cope with margin calls or of an insurance 
portfolio investment’s calls for sale of shares when the price falls and for buying them if the price 
increase. While the problem of information could become more serious, when it comes to invest in 
a foreign  market than when  we invest in  the domestic market, imitating the behavior of  other 
investors may also have a maximizing tendency. 
Following this logic suggests that (1) individual investors tend to imitate the behavior of 
other investors  rather than institutional  investors who benefit  of financial resources needed for 
collecting and processing information about foreign markets and (2) non resident investors have a 
tendency to imitate much more of the trading strategies of residents investors, foreign investors 
assuming that the latter have more information about the country in which they live. 
There is an alternative explanation for adopting this type of behavior among institutional 
investors.  Unlike  the  institutional  investors,  the  managers  of  investment  funds  are  subject  to 
continuous  review  (e.g.,  quarterly  for  mutual  funds  and  annually  for  pension  funds)  on  their 
performance in relation to a reference point and / or one from another, determining the investors to 
mimic each other trading mode to a greater extent. This suggests a forecast made in a perspective 
opposite  to  the  asymmetry  of  information,  namely  (1)  institutional  investors  have  a  more 
accentuated “herd” behavior than individual investors, and that (2) there is no presumption that can 
make as  to sustain an  increase in this copying behavior  for institutional  non resident form  the 
residents ones (assuming that all face the same regular comparison of their performance). 
Analysis of concrete situations may partly reveal if higher income generated by trading 
strategies  that  rely  on  the  income  generated  in  the  past  are  due  to  the  related  risk  changing 
characteristics  or  to  behavioral  trends.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  investors  that  are  generally 
perceived as sophisticated, are following momentum strategies (which are based on impulse) and 
get a superior performance (either because of momentum, taking the decisions before others, or 
because other superior investment features which they possess). Moreover, suppose that investors 
that are generally perceived as being naive or uninformed or uneducated (those who have lower 
profits) are adopting contrary trading strategies, perceived as abnormal (or that not take into account 
the financial theory), thereby obtain an inferior performance. This would be consistent with the 
assertion that the impulse is a behavioral abnormality in which "smart" investors take advantage of 
"naive" investors. 
The inverse relation between behavior and performance of foreign and domestic investors 
could be inferred by adding a constraint   each sale transaction coincides with a buying transaction. 
Therefore if the buying transaction occurs after an impulse, then the sale shows a contrary behavior. 
This property is also valid for the group transactions. For this reason, when institutional investors’ Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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strategies are characterized by impulse, then the trading act of the investors who do not belong to 
the institutional class must present contrary behavior, and vice versa. 
Generally, the more sophisticated are domestic investors and the greater the capital invested 
in shares, the less contrary behavior shows the investment strategy. 
Creators of the utility theory insist on lowering the relevance of individual investor behavior 
as financial markets are increasingly driven by institutional investors. These professionals are most 
likely rational investors; thereby they are sicking to make profit. Of course they benefit of the most 
effective analytical tools available. In such a market sophisticated investors are the ones which, by 
exploiting the arbitrage opportunities on the market, establish market prices. 
Are professional investors really immune to behavioral abnormalities? We focus primarily 
on the disposition effect, which describes the tendency of investors to sell shares whose prices have 
increased  (the  wining  ones)  before  those  whose  prices  have  fallen  (the  loser  one).  Behavioral 
researchers attribute this phenomenon to a combination of "risk aversion” and „anchoring” to an 
asset. In  an efficient market, the disposition effect should not be  present, the price paid when 
purchasing an asset should be a cost much exceeded by the time of sale. 
Our  results  could  be  part  of  the  manifestation  of  a  much  larger  phenomenon  in  which 
investors, typically, are eager to collect the money that the winning shares brought them or to buy 
shares with declining prices, or both, whereas sophisticated investors are patient enough to do the 
opposite. If it is true that non  sophisticated investors react based on past trends, they also should 
have exaggerated reactions contrary to other types of information such as earnings announcement. 
The behavior of individual investors may yet be considered rational and irrational? And 
which of the two types of behavior can lead to the spread of financial crisis, to the contagion? 
 
The study 
To analyze the influence of investor behavior, we chose to pay attention to the reaction of 
Romanian financial market during the last financial crisis. The current financial crisis’ starting point 
was the fall of sub prime market in the United States in August 2007. This fall had many negative 
effects on the global financial market: first the U.S. had to act on financial markets by helping 
financial institutions in difficulty and then lowering FED’s (Federal Reserve System) reference 
interest rate in order to relaunch the real economy. However the measures taken could not stop the 
propagation of financial crisis on other financial markets. 
The Romanian capital market, being an open market, can be influenced by external events, 
meaning that by definition could be the "beneficiary" of the contagion effect. However, to measure 
contagion  influences  in  Romania  during  the  current  financial  crisis  we  also  have  to  take  into 
account the links with other countries such as trade links, macroeconomic links and policy links and 
if the Romanian financial market reacts in the same manner in which other states did, states that are 
linked to Romania in this way, it not shows contagion but only shows the interdependence between 
Romania and this others countries. 
To measure the Romania's commercial linkages with another country should be calculated 
the share of foreign trade with this country form total foreign trade of Romania. 
In figure No: 1 we’ve selected countries with which Romania is conducting commercial 
transactions (import and export) that excess at least 1% of total foreign trade of Romania. Romania 
has the strongest trade links with Italy (22.06% of total) and Germany (15.38% of total). We can 
see that foreign trade with the European Union member states hold over 70% of total foreign trade 
of our country. Considering this and also that starting with 2007 Romania is an European Union 
member state, we could draw the conclusion that trade links, political links and even those made on 
macroeconomic bases (since the entry into the EU implies the integration into a common market 
with the same operating rules and later, entering into the euro area) between Romania and the 
European Union are strong enough that our capital market can be influenced by the development of 
the European Union capital markets.. As we have brought into question in the beginning of the Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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article, a financial market crisis, it is transmitted primarily through the classical channels, which 
shows that the evolution of the Romanian capital market will be influenced by the evolution of 
capital markets in European Union in a very large proportion. However the influence of these 
markets may not be 100% because foreign trade does not reach 100% and the macro economical 
bases are not identical with those of the European Union as a whole. 
 
 
Fig. no. 1 – Percentage of other countries’ foreign trade with Romania 
 
To see if there is any contagious influence on Romanian market during the crisis we chose 
to compare the variation in securities prices traded on the capital market. For this we followed the 
BET and Euronext 100 evolution. BET index reflects the total capitalization of the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange, the one which represents the Romanian capital market and the Euronext 100 shows the 
market capitalization for the first one hundred stocks that are the most traded securities of Euronext. 
In our study we considered the Euronext exchange market as the one market which represents all 
the influences of capital markets in the European Union. The companies’ shares included in the 
Euronext 100 have more than 80% of market capitalization. To achieve a better comparability of 
the data set we referred to BET's value expressed in euro (so we made sure that the evolution is not 
influenced by the exchange rate) and in our charts we translated it’s graph into a closer position to 
Euronext 100’s graphic (by dividing the BET value with ten) in order to obtain a better view. 
The period of data collection is of 2 years from 21 February 2007 on 19 February 2009, 
daily recordings (without weekends and holidays). We used this period in order to include both the 
period before the beginning of the crisis on US sub prime market and the period extended till after 
the last drop in the global stock exchange, i.e. 15 October 2008. 
So, to be in concordance with the biggest events included in this two years period, we 
divided our plot in 3 periods first: from 21 February 2007 to August 1 2007 (a period that does not 
include major events, being the one that shows a normal period),  second: from August 1 2007 until 
June 1 2008 (a period that includes the beginning of the crisis on U.S. market and shows it effects 
on the other markets), third: from June 1 2008 until 19 February  2009, a period which includes the 
last fall of capital markets around the world. 
We can see from Figure No: 2 that although the general trend of the two indices is the same, 
namely it shows a growth, the two indices do not evolve in the same way, in an identical manner. 
There are common points only when price falls and the last part of the BET graph recorded a higher 
growth than the Euronext index. This is consistent with our theory, namely that between the two 
markets there is the phenomenon of interdependence and that interdependence becomes stronger 
only when it was a shock, an abrupt decrease on a market. Since it is impossible that at that time the Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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degree of interdependence recorded a sudden change in, we could say that is clear evidence of an 
influence of investor behavior, which reacts to the shock of the first market (probably Euronext) by 
adopting a similar behavior on the second market. So investors sell assets because they expect their 
price to fall and thereby lead to a true lowering of prices. 
 
 
Figure no.2 - The evolution of the two indexes between 21.02.2007 and 1.08.2007 
 
While the companies included in the Euronext 100 index have more than 80% of the total 
capitalization of this market, it is obvious that sudden changes in prices value in this market can be 
determined only by the behavior of institutional investors, the ones that have the sufficient financial 
strength to influence the market. 
Watching the developments in the BET index we see that on the Romanian market the 
assets  depreciation  is  more  intense.  We  can  thus  draw  the  following  conclusions,  namely,  1) 
investors on the Romanian market are uninformed investors (probably because of high costs that 
would require getting specific information about other countries and because that cost could not 
cover the possible gains in this market) or in any case they have less information than those on the 
European market and then mimic  their actions to achieve profits or 2) on the Romanian market are 
the same investors as on the European market and they withdraw funds from our market to cover 
losses on the more powerful Euronext stock exchange. 
 
 
Figure no. 3 - The evolution of the two indexes between 1.08.2007 and 1.06.2008 
 
We can remark from the No: 3 figure that after the outbreak of the crisis on the sub prime 
market in the United States (first abrupt fall of the figure), the evolution of the two indices is much 
more similar than in the before period and in the second part of the period (from January 2008), 
when the financial crisis began to touch financial markets Europe, changes in the two indices are 
almost identical. 
This clearly demonstrates the contagion of the Romanian market (the reverse is probably 
impossible because the difference in financial power is too high and so an eventual fall of the Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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Romanian market will not have a powerful effect over the Euronext stock exchange) since the 
economic or financial crisis was not yet felt by the Romanian economy. 
We can see the Romania investor’s indecision in the first part of No: 3 figure, who did not 
know how to react in front of this financial shock. However, with the financial crisis taking over 
Europe, it seems that investors had withdrew a large part of funds from Romanian market waiting 
to see how the Romanian economy will react in front of this crisis. While Euronext does not have 
the same decreasing trend and the same sharp rising of prices, we can suspect that we have to blame 
the Romanian investors for the market evolution, Romanian investors being much less prepared in 
terms of trading strategies and did not know how to react. This is again consistent with the theory of 
investor behavior influence on financial markets, as there is a relative stabilization of the Romanian 
market in the second part of the graph and we can assume that on the market remained only those 




Figure no. 4 - The evolution of the two indexes between 1.06.2008 and 19.02.2009 
 
We can notice from No: 4 figure, that along with the awareness of the financial crisis in 
Europe, till the collapse of stock exchanges across the globe on September 17 and then on October 
15 2008, points that are highly visible on our chart, the two indices had a similar trend, but after 15 
October 2008 the Romanian market continued to decline while Euronext has managed to maintain. 
While, most certain other elements of the interdependence equation remained largely the same, the 
pronounced decrease of the Romanian stock exchange may be due only to the investors behavior, 
mostly foreign investors. They had to cover the losses they suffered and than it is rational to assume 
that they have decided to withdraw from those markets that are too volatile (such as Romanian 
market) to be able to secure profits in other safer markets, the way Euronext would be. A massive 
withdrawal  of  such  investors  has  led  to  a  pronounced  decrease  in  assets’  prices  traded  at  the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange, thus reaching the paradoxical situation in which some stocks are traded 
with a market value that is not even worth half of their economical value. 
  More than that, we can try to identify specific reaction based on a statistic offered by BVB 
which is referreing to the hall market in term of residents and nonresidents, firms and peoples. Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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Figure no. 5 - The procentaje of nonresidents firms sells in total sells of firms 
 
For the entire studied period, non residents firms had an average of 54,67% in total sells of 
participant firms on Romanian market. On the chart are easily observed the higher and the lowest 
value, meaning 77,61% in December 2008 and 29,17% in May 2008. 
So we can say that non resident firms are not following a long term strategy, their are just 
“going with the flow” and alos that the non resident firms are ambiguity adverse that way the 
biggest sell on November 2008 when the Romanian capital market falled. 
 
 
Figure no.6 - The procentaje of residents non-firms in total purchases of non-firms 
 
If we take a quick look at the figure no.6 we can draw the conclusion that non firms are 
trading based on moods and feeling. Why? Because the range of values of purchases is between 
87,29% and 97,04% in total non firms, but the range of values of sells is between 91,38% and 
97,63%  in  total  non firms. We  can  see  that  massive  purchases in  one  month  are followed  by 
massive sells in another as the example of september octomber 2007 shows as; Romanian investors Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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had  95,96%  of  purchases  of  nonfirms  in  September  and  in  October  when  the  crisis  started  to 
propagate had the biggest share is sells of nonfirm for the entire period of analysis. 
 
Conclusions 
The appearance of the contagion phenomena makes a very important object of study in our 
days. The investors were using international portfolio diversification in order to reduce their risk. 
Because of the recent development of the financial market (the increased degree of integration) this 
diversification it can not be easily obtained. 
Taking into account the Romanian situation and the way the Romanian capital market has 
evolved in the period preceding  the crisis and in  the  one after the beginning of the crisis, we 
conclude the following: 
  The investors behavior, whether individual or rational, has a great influence on the capital 
market evolution; 
  Financial markets are contagious in front of financial crises of the other markets only 
because of the investors behavior, noticing that the shocks registered on a stronger market are most 
certain transmitted to a smaller exchange stock market. These shocks are transmitted only if they 
are negative, i.e. indicating a decrease in the value of financial securities. We may therefore surmise 
that investors are more tempted to imitate the behavior of other investors when they think they will 
lose otherwise; 
Even  if  we  can  surly  prove  that  there  is  an  influence  of  the  investor  behavior  in  the 
propagation  of financial crises and sometimes even starting them  would be very interesting to 
quantify accurately their influence to prevent such financial contagion. In light of this study we can 
add that the comovement of prices in two markets will increase when confronted with crisis making 
the investors to “lose” their diversification of risk. So by knowing what droves contagion these 




1.  Baur, Dirk G. and Fry, Renee, Multivariate Contagion and Interdependence (November 1, 
2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=877725 
2.  Chui Michael, Hall Simon, Taylor Ashley, (2004), “Crisis spillovers in emerging market 
economies:  interlinkages,  vulnerabilities  and  investor  behaviour”,  Bank  of  England 
Working Paper no. 212, Available at 
      http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/workingpapers/wp212.pdf 
3.  Dornbush Rudiger, Yung Chul, Stijn Claessens (2000) – “Contagion. How it spreads and 
How it can be stopped”, available at  
http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/documents/C
laessens Dornbusch Park.pdf 
4.  Dornbush Rudiger, Yung Chul, Stijn Claessens (2000), “ Contagion: Understanding How It 
Spreads”, The World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2) 
5.  Forbes K., Rigobon R. (2002) – “No Contagion Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock 
Market Co movements”, Journal of Finance, v57(5,Oct) 
6.  Gallo  M.Giampiero,  Otranto  Edoardo  (2005),  “  Volatility  Transmission  in  Financial 
Markets:  A  New  Approach”,  Econometrics  Working  Papers  Archive  wp2005_10, 
Universita'  degli  Studi  di  Firenze,  Dipartimento  di  Statistica  "G.  Parenti",  available  at 
http://www.ds.unifi.it/ricerca/pubblicazioni/working_papers/2005/wp2005_10.pdf 
7.  John M. Griffin, Jeffrey H. Harris, Selim Topaloglu, (2003), “ Investor Behavior over the 
Rise and Fall of Nasdaq”, Available at 
      http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/milbourn/bubble%20Sep%204%2003.pdf Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
  567
8.  Mark  Grinblat,  Matti  Keloharju  (2000),  “  The  investment  behavior  and  performance  of 
various investor types: a study of Finland's unique data set”, Journal of Financial Economics 
55 
9.  G.H.Ionescu, S.A.Trică, R.D.Vilag, E.Radu (2008), “Contagion versus Interdependence on 
Financial Markets”, Special issue of review of Management and Economical Engineering, 
vol 7., nr.7 
10. Kaminsky G.L., Reinhart C.M. (2000),  “On Crisis Contagion and Confusion”, Journal of 
International Economics, 51(1) 
11. Mody A., Taylor M. (2003), “Common Vulnerabilities”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3759, 
available at 
      http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1678/1/WRAP_Taylor_CEPR DP3759%5B1%5D.pdf 
12. Zur Shapira, Itzhak Venezia,(2000), “Patterns of behavior of professionally managed and 
independent investors”, USC Marshall School of Bussines 
13. Shiller,Robert J., (2000), “Irrational exuberance”, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey. 
14. R.D.Vilag, G.H.Ionescu, M.D.Ungureanu, I.Vasile (2009), „Contagion causes – rational or 
irraitional  behavior”,  16
th  International  Economic  Conference  –  IECS  2009  „Industrial 
revolution,  from  globalization  and  post globalization  perspective”,  Universitatea  Lucian 
Blaga – Sibiu 7 8 Mai 2009 
15. Walti  Sebastien  (2003),  “Contagion  and  interdependence  among    Central  European 
economies:  the  impact  of  coomon  external  shocks”,  HEI  Working  Paper  No:  02/2003,  
Available at http://hei.unige.ch/sections/ec/pdfs/Working_papers/HEIWP02 2003.pdf 
16. www.bvb.ro 